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Book Reviews
ADmwsTRATVE LAw.

By Kenneth Culp Davis.*

St.

Paul. West Publishing Company, 1951. Pp. xvi, 1024. $8.00.
This is the first adequate text on administrative law.
Even so, as Mr. Davis modestly recognizes, it is not a
"systematic statement of principles." It is no more than
an attempt "to organize the problems," to summarize such
law as lends itself to summarization, and to contribute to
solution of some of the many uncertainties that obstruct
systematic treatment of administrative law.'
The essentially tentative nature of this book results not
from any deficiency of the author's, but rather from the
immense difficulties presented by his subject. One who
writes on administrative law is necessarily a pioneer; for
behind him there are no outstanding works other than the
now dated Report of the Attorney General's Committee
(published in 1941) and the Pike & Fischer service, which,
though indispensable, is not a text. The law review material
in the field, much of it excellent in quality, is necessarily
fragmentary.
Besides this teitlessness - which exists in hardly any
other important field of the law - administrative law is
only by courtesy "horizontal": generalizations about administrative law, except the very broadest, are dangerous;
for the answer to a problem usually depends almost exclusively on the agency concerned, the statutes under which
it operates, and the precise nature of the proceeding before
it.
Obstacles such as these are what make the practice of
administrative law at once fascinating and frustrating and what make Mr. Davis's text a welcome one despite its
failure to hurdle them all.
Mr. Davis's approach is above all sensible and constructive. He rightly refuses to frame his text on the concepts
which once seemed bulwarks against absolutism, but which,
though still litigated with frequency in administrative appeals, are becoming less and less fruitful sources of results.
For example, the companion dogmas of separation and
delegation of governmental powers are treated briefly,
without ridicule, but also without any suggestion that they
are today capable of solving any but the most clear-cut
'Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1 DAVIS, p. iii.
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administrative abuses. Insofar as "delegation" remains a
living issue - the extent to which subdelegation within
agencies is permissible - Mr. Davis suggests a rule of
reason coinciding with the rules long applicable to delegations by the President.2 The suggestion is typical of Mr.
Davis's thoughtful attempts to cut through the tangle the
courts and the Congress have made in even the simpler
areas of administrative law.
Such modest suggestions as this, however, by no means
measure the full extent of Mr. Davis's contribution. His
chapter on "Investigation," for example, is an admirable
organization of a subject which is one of the obscurest in
administrative law and yet one of the more important.
Though the investigatory powers of agencies are barely
recognized by the Administrative Procedure Act, their
effect on the substantive rights of citizens is tremendous
and they are restrained by few of the traditional safeguards.' Mr. Davis ably traces the fall and rise of agency
"fishing expeditions" and makes a masterly effort to define
the limits of judicial inquiry in enforcing administrative
subpoenas.4 One need not share his rather uncritical enthusiasm for unrestricted agency investigation5 to appreciate the clarity of his summary and analysis.
Mr. Davis's gift for lucid summary of difficult issues is
likewise demonstrated in his spirited defense of the
"institutional decision." He cuts to the heart of the
Morgan7 cases, examines the responses of several of the
states to the first Morgan case, and provocatively discusses
the merits and faults of the anonymous group decisions that
are becoming standard in more and more agency adjudications. Mr. Davis favors even fuller use of, or at least
experimentation with, group decisions, a view to which
'Ibid, §§22-24.

3Mr. Davis' characterization of Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.
United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933), seems to me to elide its point (p. 134,
n. 224). It is true, as Mr. Davis says, that the Supreme Court permitted the
Tariff Commission to prevent a party's examination of "business facts";
but precisely those facts were what the inquiry - and the amount of the
tariff - turned on. In short, the case holds that cross-examination on basic
-facts is solely a matter of agency grace in any proceeding labeled "investigation."
' DAvIS, §37.

'Which the courts seem to be approaching: Mr. Davis grandly concludes
that "the Constitution has changed sides" concerning the safeguards surrounding agency investigation and is now "on the side of the democratic
will" (p. 136).
DAVIS, Chap. 8.

'Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468 (1936); Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1
(1938) ; U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939) ; U. S. v. Morgan, 313 U. S.
409 (1941).
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most administrative practitioners, I think, would not accede. Nevertheless, disagreement with Mr. Davis's conclusion should not obscure the originality and force of his
presentation, which is well worth pondering.
Mr. Davis defines "bias" as "honest opinion."8 In that
sense, he is biased in favor of the fullest agency discretion,
limited only by broad due process guarantees enforced by
the courts. He is, indeed, biased in favor of bias in administrative officials. He thinks they cannot afford to be indifferent or neutral respecting the policies they are to
administer, even though such administration is in large
part through decisions which are in essence judicial. I
cannot fully share Mr. Davis's belief in administrative
"bias," for in practice it tends to produce decisions, some
of immense importance, which are based only partially on
the facts of record and which stem largely from some
"policy," some "bias" in the administrative mind that cannot stand -

and does not receive -

analysis.

This "bias" of the author's, though an open and honest
one, leads him to gloss over some of the faults and dangers
of the federal administrative system. His discussion of the
Chenery9 cases 0 may very profitably be compared with
the discussion in a Note in the Harvard Law Review.1 1
The latter raises serious doubts about the present law
governing administrative grounds of decision which Mr.
Davis seems to disregard as unimportant. I think them
worthy of careful discussion and I wish Mr. Davis had
addressed himself to them. Mr. Davis's "bias" seems to
make him partly unaware that administrative performance
seldom equals administrative promise; that the "expertise"
of administrators and staffs is sometimes fictional-, that the
existence of a sound procedural rule is no assurance it
will be followed. A case in point is the CAB's prehearing
conference, which Mr. Davis regards as exemplifying the
"greatest success" among agency pretrial procedures.1 2 In
reality, the CAB's prehearing conference comes nowhere
near measuring up to its promise.
It would be wrong to give the impression that Mr. Davis
is exclusively, or even mostly, preoccupied with the philosophical aspects of his subject. On the contrary, most of
his chapters are devoted to practical learning enlightened
1DAVIS, p. 373.
9 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943) ; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U. 10S. 194 (1947).
DAVIS, §169.
n 62 Harv. L. Rev. 478 (1949).
DAVIS, pp. 284-285.
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by criticism which is always constructive in purpose and,
so far as I am able to judge, almost always sound. Chapter
14, on res judicata, is a particularly brilliant one. It is
much more than the dreary marshalling of facts and holdings it might have been. Mr. Davis examines the judicial
doctrine of res judicata and then explores the degree to
which it should be relaxed as applied to administrative proceedings. He combines his perceptive discussion of the
cases with constant reference to the reasons why res judicata exists in any kind of proceeding. He rightly condemns13 the unintelligent doctrine of the Maryland Court
of Appeals that no administrative decision can ever be res
judicata because no agency is "judicial." Obviously - and
the matter would be much less obvious without Mr. Davis's
analysis - the application of res judicata to administrative
proceedings must depend not on agency labels but on
agency functions; and the exact rule applied must approach
or recede from the rigor of the judicial rule depending on
the likeness or unlikeness of particular agency functions,
purposes, and procedures to those of courts. I venture that
any lawyer faced with a res judicata problem in administrative law would be wise to study Mr. Davis's Chapter 14.
In view of his book's many excellences, it is most unfortunate that Mr. Davis has felt impelled to patronize practicing lawyers and in so doing to take an emotional and
protective attitude toward his subject. The time is long
past when emotion about administrative law on either side
does any good, but Mr. Davis adopts the unfortunate device
of putting a chip on his reader's shoulder at the outset of
his book and then promptly knocking it off. The lawyer
who tries to approach administrative law with an open mind
cannot help some feeling of resentment at this treatment;
and the practitioner who uses the book - as he should in an attempt to answer a client's problem will not be
grateful for being characterized as an extraordinarily stupid
"John Smith" in Sec. 5. "Mr. Smith" is a creature imagined
by the author, described as a "typical practitioner" who has
been at the bar for fifteen years or more, whose attitude
toward administrative agencies and the law which governs
them consists in blind condemnation, fear and even hysteria.
In Sec. 6 "Mr. Smith" is metamorphosed into "the bar."
Mr. Davis, then, affects to consider the bar as composed
almost entirely of practitioners whose views on administrative law roughly parallel the views which an unusually
Is

btid, pp. 596-7.
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dull Neanderthal man might be expected to take of steelpointed arrows. It is not surprising - and it is hardly
enlightening - that Mr. Davis manages to demolish "Mr.
Smith's" opinions.
The motivation for this performance can doubtless be
found in some of the reports and recommendations of the
American Bar Association on administrative law, which
were themselves emotional and ill-advised to say the least.
It is significant that the volume and tone of such pronouncements have been considerably tempered in recent years. In
any event, there is certainly no call to assume that the bar
is wholly or even mostly unreconstructed, though some
unregenerates may remain. It seems to me that the bar as
a whole accepts

-

as it must -

the fact that governmental

regulation of economic life will continue, and will continue
to be carried out through administrative agencies. The
problem of the bar is not to fight these agencies or even to
prevent their multiplication, but rather to make them work
as they should. That problem cannot even be stated in
"John Smith" terms; but the remainder of Mr. Davis's book
goes far toward exposing its framework.
EDWARD G. HoWARD14

PHILOSOPHY OF DKIvOCRAnic GovERNnir. By Yves R.
Simon. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 324.
$3.50.
How is it possible to give, in a short compass, even a
fairly adequate review of this book?
The author surely aims to dig deeply and to argue fairly
about that little understood thing "democracy".
To Supreme Court Justice Douglas democracy seems to
be a simple concept which he implies will lead us to the
promised land.1
Democracy, however, cannot be defined and one of its
champions, C. K. Allen, the author of "Democracy and the
4Of the Delaware, Maryland, and District of Columbia bars.
I Justice Douglas on March 22, 1948, made an address at the University of
Florida, which address can be found in the Congressional Record of April 6,
1948, pages A2221 et seq. I pointed out in a letter published in 34 Am. Bar
Ass'n. J. 1145-6 (Dec., 1948), the lack of philosophy in Justice Douglas'
address and later in 4 Univ. of Florida L. Rev., No. 1 (Spring of 1951),
reviewed a book by C. K. ALLEN, DEMOCRACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL, and in

that again paid my respects to Justice Douglas.
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Individual" calls attention to the great danger of man in
the mass.
Professor Simon in Chapter V, "Democracy and Technology", gives a thoughtful if somewhat disturbing analysis
of the modern mass worker which is free of the usual generalizations. Man he says seeks "distinction" and this distinction is not so much a desire for superiority as it is for
uniqueness.2 Here we must remember also that the material
condition of the workers has greatly improved,3 which is
also pointed out by Ortega-in his "Revolt of the Masses".
That men are lonely in great cities is nothing new.4 But
the mass worker of today, a mere cog in a great machine,
not knowing to whom the product will go and with no sense
of service, is a lonely, frustrated man whose psychology
centers about recompense. 5 And this lonely and frustrated
man is apt to become the victim of a totalitarian leader
"....

who knows how to give millions an intoxicating ex-

perience of integration in a community and of participation
in its great work".0
The small individual farmer is praised for his way of
life.7 But farm youth migrates to the city' and mass production is here to stay. 9
The author has no pet plan for these troubles but
asks for ".

.

. never ending inquiry into difficulties which

cannot disappear but can be defined with more and more
precision".10
Unions come in for high praise and are said to help their
members not only in collective bargaining but in extending a sense of brotherhood to individual workers."1 Yet
the danger of
dictatorial power in a minority in unions is
2
recognized.

There is an important distinction between Fascism and
National Socialism on the one hand and Communism on
the other. The end of Fascism is now while the end of
Communism is in the future; a rosy promise for a future
Utopia."3 I think the best criticism of Marx and Communism is in Chapter XIV of Isabel Paterson's "God of
311, 312.
8Ibid, 313, 321.
'Ibid, 308.
5Ibid, 311.
0Ibid, 309. See, too, 276, 278, 279.
'Ibid, 300, 306, 322.
Ibid, 319.
Ibid, 312, 318.
Ibid, 318.
SIbd, 305, 317, 319.
Ibid, 138.
21
Ibid, 2, 4, 116, 134.
'SIMON,
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the Machine" where she compares it to the theory of a
perpetual motion machine. The Communists' theory that
the State will eventually "wither away" is also discussed
in Journal of the History of Ideas VI, 468 and VII, 113.
The difficulty of saying who is a "good" man is great,
yet the author says "one single vice causes a man to be bad;
a man is not good unless he possesses all the virtues". But
there is no evidence that the candidates elected by these
bad men have, as a rule, been failures. 14 Again in most
societies criminals are in the minority and the non-criminal
element together with the minority who are on the whole
morally good are sufficient to form a democratic society,15
even though wretchedly weak characters "make up the
overwhelming majority of men". 6 There may be a little
more to add for democratic strength. 7
The shift in the "liberal" position is referred to" and
also the 18th Century idea of "progress" in which the author
seems to have but little belief.
We appear to have no absolute line to follow, nevertheless we must always strive and continue to improve existing conditions. But as to the "end" of law or government,
it seems to me we are not wise enough to define it.
On the legal side Dean Pound of the Harvard Law School
in his "Interpretations of Legal History" suggested his
engineering interpretation by which great judges should be
guided in their constructive opinions and decisions. But I
tried in a review of that book to show the error in his suggestion. The engineer in designing a bridge knows where
it is to begin and the "end" to which it goes while the judges
could not know the end. This point is touched on in the
book now being reviewed. 9
The author takes the position that authority or government is not a "necessary evil" but is unqualifiedly good; a
Ibid, 81.
Ibid, 83.
"Ibid, 117.
"Ibid, 92, 93. See also: Ibid, 110, 117, 145, '205, 214. 216, 219, 228, 315.
Though reluctant to introduce a note of levity in this review, the argument of Anatole France's character Abbe Coignard in THE REaNE PEDArQUE,
Chapter XVIII, seems apposite. Approaching a town the Abbe discussed
with his disciple the paradox of the inhabitants of a town being usually
greedy persons filled with passions and in many cases debauched, who

nevertheless set up authority over them in the town to prevent them from

doing the very things they want to do. From this he drew the conclusion
that as no logical reason could be assigned for such conduct the city, there-

fore, must be a divine institution.
1sSIMON, 6.
Is Ibid, 123, 137, 197, 291.
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEyAL HISTORY by ROSCOE POUND (Macmillan, 1923).
My review of this book Is published in 9 Virginia L. Rev. 666 (1923).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XlIII

position which I think is too strongly stated. He gives the
case of the necessity for choice between one of two alternative courses of action about which sensible persons may
differ. In such cases authority must decide and to that extent authority is necessary. But where is State power to
be stopped? Here, I think, is one of the real defects in this
treatment at all of
book for the author gives no adequate
20
That we have delibermajority rule and minority rights.
ately destroyed the safeguards against concentrated power
and the protection of minorities which the framers of the
Constitution and of the first ten amendments provided is,
I think, tragic but the author merely refers to it in passing."
The author gives an interesting account of the change
which occurred in Proudhon's thought. Proudhon began as
a philosophic anarchist, that is, he opposed government in
any form. Later he concluded that the State was inevitable
and fearing the increase in its power his thoughts turned
the
towards counteracting its power and he concluded that
this. 2
institution of private property would help towards
Jefferson's Declaration of Independence referred to the
rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" but in
his later draft of the Fifth Amendment he had changed this
to "life, liberty and property".
Now it seems to me that the extent to which in this country, (especially of late) property rights have been attacked
and seriously injured is a matter for grave consideration
and as I see it the result has been reached by a combination
of sophistical reasoning in the Supreme Court's opinions
on constitutional questions, together with the unlimited
power of taxing incomes given to the Federal Government
by the 16th Amendment.
How is the great power of the majority to be in any way
counteracted? The author says that skill and the possession
of property will act as forces against the majority and
"It thus seems that conservative worries about the waste
equalitarian rule of universal suffrage are
caused by 2the
3
excessive".
My own view is that universal suffrage is, on the whole,
the best, for no conceivable selected "elite" of voters would
have the character sufficient to restrict their use of power.

s

SiMoN, 99, 207.
Ibid, 136.
In this connection see Should We Revive the Constitution? by Donald R.
Richberg, 38 Am. Bar Ass'n. J. 35 (Jan. 1952). See also my article The
Constitution and socialism published in 12 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
SIMoN, 134.
x Ibid, 96.
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However, to regard the decisions of a majority of voters
as always determining the rightness of particular questions
is simply childish. Thus though I believe in the jury system,
I know that verdicts of juries are often wrong. On important and difficult questions where solid reasoning is
necessary much can be said for Ibsen's Dr. Stockmann who
said "The majority is never right".2 4
The author's discussion of "equality of opportunity"
shows that even this principle must be closely examined.
The principle arose apparently with the Saint-Simonists
who were both rationalistic and anti-democratic.2 5 Their
plan was the abolition of inheritance but the author, discusses the ultimate position to which this would lead. If all
were to have equal opportunity then such opportunity
apparently would begin at birth with "pools" of children
having hired nurses in charge of them and the family as
such would then come to an end. Even with the suppression
of inheritance, a doctor's son, for instance, who wanted to
be a doctor would enjoy facilities not possessed by say the
son of a coal miner.2" Again the granting of scholarships
to qualified students is good provided the student himself
takes advantage of the opportunity and is willing to leave
the environment to which he was born. But if those in
charge of public education put pressure on young men and
thereby force a change in environment this again "....

looks

like an orderly slaughter of the goods procured by integration in the family and other small units".2 7
Equality of opportunity within proper limits is a principle which I think is correct. But how far is it to go? If a
family conserves its property, if its members by foresight,
self-sacrifice or ambition want to send its children to private
schools where an education superior to the public school
education can be obtained it would be folly to prevent them.
The author's discussion of "profit" in trade or business
seems to incline him toward the view that there is something immoral about it. As to traders, even when there is
no "sophistication", a trading transaction he says is questionable because there is no "measure" of the amount which
" SOME REFLECTIONS ON JURISPRUDENCE by W. W.

BUCKLAND

(University

Press, Cambridge, 1945) p. 17 - "He (,Krabbe) tells us that the majority
opinion has the highest claim to represent the nation, that it is in some
way sacrosanct. He treats what is in fact a rather clumsy way, used for
lack of a better, of finding out what legislation is desirable as having some
necessary infallibility about It."
SIMON, 224.
Ibid, 225, 227.
Ibid, 229.
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the trader may gain in the transaction while on the other
hand real wealth like food and shelter can be measured by
a person's reasonable needs.2" For a writer who has a just
aversion to bureaucracy one wonders how this "profit"
motive is to be controlled.2 9 The classic view is that a trader
who buys goods at one place where there is an over-plus and
sells them at another where there is a shortage has performed a legitimate and important operation.
Does the author believe in that old cliche of "production
for use" which must mean State control? If the profit
motive is ethically wrong it can only be controlled in two
ways; one way would be State control and the other would
be a change in the moral nature of man."0
The author continues his criticism of the "profit motive"31 and then winds up with this, "Such a system rules
out the infuriating disorders, so intensely resented by the
men of the Twentieth Century, resulting from non-distribution of the available product."3 2 What, I wonder, does he
mean by this?
The author's discussion of "Sovereignty in Democracy",
(Chapter III), is certainly a full and labored one. Sovereignty, he says, has become entangled with historical instances of its application and as a result the textbooks on
political science are apt to be unsound. The simplest illustration of sovereignty in democracy is the New England
Town Meeting where at one moment a certain number of
farmers in their fields are different in quality from the
same farmers later acting in an assembly for the community's affairs.
-

bid, 239.

Ibid, 206, 252.
w' In HISTORY AS THE STORY OF LYBEnTY by BENDEDEOr
CROCE (W. W.
Norton and Company, 1941) the famous author referring to economic reforms says that even if things improve because of them "... evil has not
for that reason been rooted up, it remains in the heart in Its ancient or in
some newer form. It cannot be conquered with economic means but solely
with moral means." See following pages in that book: 56, 62, 162, 256, 272,
277, 280, 311.
In THE RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMANITY by PITiRIM A. SOROKIN (Beacon

Press, 1948) the author pleads for improvement in our moral character and
suggests methods by which he hopes something can be accomplished in
that respect.
Again in CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL by ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE (Oxford University
Press, 1948) the author takes a pessimistic view of the attempt to improve
our moral natures, for he concludes that the endowments of human beings
"... with original sin and with natural goodness will be about the same
on the average as they always have been."
1 SimoN, 249.
Ibid, 315.
- Ibid, 144.
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This agrees with the "Coach Driver" theory that the
coach driver is the mere servant of those being driven who
direct his movements." The flaw in the coach driver theory
is that it assumes all the passengers in the coach to be of
one opinion. Yet as government is necessary, laws properly
passed must be obeyed by those opposed to them, otherwise
anarchy or secession would follow. And this obedience to
laws is an "ethical" command.3 5
Then follows a discussion of the "transmission" theory
of government, and a highly theoretical discussion of the
divine power of the Pope as distinguished from the divine
power of kings as laid down by King James, and the works
of Cajetan, Bellarmine and Suarez are discussed.3 6 However, the "transmission" theory is not distinctly democratic:
It is a general political concept. The author follows Aquinas
in saying that basically sovereignty resides in the whole
people and that democracy alone admits of non-transmission of power.37
Democracy is said never to transmit the whole of the
transmissible powers and so remains in varying degrees a
"direct" democracy. 8
But when power is lawfully transmitted by democracy
the agent who holds the power should exercise it according
to his own views and it is not "ethical" to try by propaganda
to force him to follow another course.39 Any other course
on the part of the holders of transmissible powers than to
carry out their own views is treachery and pressures which
lead
come to them come, in most cases from minorities, may
40
not to direct democracy but to oligarchic situations.
I have thus tried to point out the outlines of the author's
consideration of "Sovereignty in Democracy" without attempting any criticism of its subtle distinctions thinking
perhaps that those whose work lies in this field will want to
make a thorough study of this book.
Historically our democracy carhe into being as a reaction
against the authority of kings and it took the form of opposition to the enroachments of government. On the other hand
"French democracy soon gave birth to what was often
described as the first embodiment of the modern totalitarianism, i.e., the Jacobin rule".4 1
-IN

t, 147-151.

Ibid, 145, 149, 153.
- Ibid, 158-177.
v Ibid, 158, 181.
- Ibid, 184.
- Ibid, 185.
40 Ibid, 188.
"1Ibid, 128, 133.
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Forces in opposition to democratic absolutism are "ex-

ternal to the State apparatus" and include property4 2 , the
free church, the free press, private schools, independent
labor unions and free enterprise. 3 Labor unions cannot be
free in such Jacobin democracy as is illustrated in the
modern dictatorships."
To sum up, the author gives us no blueprint for a plan
which we should attempt to carry out. His points are
argued thoroughly and authorities from Aristotle and
Aquinas to the present time are considered.
The foreword tells us that democracy is on the defensive
and that the pragmatic argument in its favor is not enough.
Realizing, as I do, that ideas are always important, I yet
ask how we can do more than to say that our system of
ideas is one based on "life, liberty and property" and that
we endeavor to enforce these principles in Courts of Justice
pursuant to law. I wonder what more can be expected of
us and how we can influence other peoples who seem to
desire slavery under the iron hand of totalitarian rulers.
WALTER
"Ibid, 134.
"Ibid, 137, 138.
"Ibid, 97, 98.
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